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Abstract. In this paper we have motivated the use of privacy-protection
measures in trust models, both in conscious exchanges of opinions and in
an unconscious way when security attacks take place. Most of the privacy
dimensions are concerned into trust communications. In particular we de-
ﬁne the privacy rights that these trusting communications must legally be
guaranteed. From them, we describe additional message exchanges that,
acting as control mechanisms, would be required to exercise such rights.
Furthermore, we also enumerated the corresponding privacy violations
that would have taken place if these control mechanisms were ignored.
From the possible existence of privacy violations, regulatory structures
may establish what agents are allowed and forbidden to do according
to the legal privacy rights. We have applied the control mechanisms as
additional message exchanges to a particular application domain (the
Agent Trust and Reputation testbed) implemented as JADE interaction
protocols, and ﬁnally we plan to deﬁne an Electronic Institution that
would rule the corresponding norms and violations to such control using
the Islander speciﬁcation tool.
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1 Introduction
The right to privacy or private life is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Article 12), the European Convention of Human Rights (Article
8) and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 7). The Charter
also contains an explicit right to the protection of personal data (Article8).
This right has several dimensions and these have been deﬁned for European and
American judges. In [1] ﬁve dimensions of privacy were identiﬁed: Privacy of the
person (bodily privacy), Privacy of personal behavior (media privacy), Privacy of
personal communications (interception privacy), Privacy of personal data (data
or information privacy) and Privacy of personal experience. Four out of these ﬁve
dimensions apply, in some extent, to any (computer-based) Information System,
but even more to decentralized trust models. While in closed systems, a central
trusting entity ensures privacy through an exhaustive control of identities and
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information exchanges, in open systems this trusting responsibility lies with
participants. This is the case of distributed and open systems, often implemented
as a collection of bio-inspired knowledge systems such as [2], also called agents.
Interactions may then have the ﬁnal intention of propagating reputation of agents
in order to decide which agent to trust in.
Speciﬁcally, two central features of trusting agents pose the main challenge to
privacy: the ability of them to collect large and detailed amounts of data about
individuals’ everyday activities over long periods of time; and the enhanced
ability for classifying and integrating these large amounts of data [3]. These
features demand reviewing trust models under light of the data protection law,
particularly under principles of Directive of Data Protection 95/16 [4]. In this
article we intend to exam these risks and we propose some solutions about the
corresponding privacy protection measures that can be adopted. In order to enjoy
the beneﬁts of the assumed autonomy of agents, we must consider a approach
to privacy and data protection,based on computer-based mechanisms of control
rather than on law restriction and prohibition [5].
Although the associated risks to privacy of most recent technology advances
have been addressed, such as in: cloud computing [6], proﬁling and data mining
[7] and ambient intelligence [8], there is no publication speciﬁcally related to the
issue of privacy protection in trust models with Agents and this paper intends
to overcome this lack.
2 Trust Models and Privacy Decision
Trust is a very relevant issue in any social relationship, even when such relation-
ship is distant and with electronic means. Therefore computer scientists have
shown an increasing interest in the study in how trust is acquired and maintained.
Speciﬁcally, when human users are represented by autonomous agents and they
acted electronically on behalf of them, the interests of these users have to be
considered in the decisions and relationships held by the corresponding agents
that represent them. A trust model is then applied by autonomous agents in two
ways: searching trustworthy partners and as an incentive/punishment mecha-
nism to prevent dishonest behaviours. Every act of an autonomous agent may
be then judged in order to compute the reputational image of such agent. This
reputational image could be computed in a centralized way as a global property
by a sole entity (as many actual commercial applications do [9]), but it implies
a loss in personalization and privacy. Therefore we assume (as many researchers
in Distributed AI) that each member of a society of agents is in charge of com-
puting the reputation of all other agents that belong to this society. Many trust
models been proposed and they are very diﬀerent among them [10]. But most
of them consider direct experiences and witness information as the main infor-
mation sources. Between them we are interested in witness information because
of its relevance to privacy issues. Additionally it is the most abundant source of
reputation (but not the most reliable), and the way it is managed is the source
of the most complexity involved in trust models. Witness information is often
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3rd Agent’s privacy concerned! 
Fig. 1. Schema of communications hold in “classic” witness information
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Fig. 2. Schema of communications hold when referrals ids were included in witness
information
called indirect information or word-of-mouth, is the information that an agent
(we call it in advance ﬁrst agent) receives from a second agent about a third one.
It can be based on the direct experiences of the second agent or it can be based
on indirect information from other agents (the so called referrals). In this case,
in many trust models, second agents just share the reputational image (a joint
computation of several direct experiences and witness information) of the third
agent, this is the ”classic” way to do it. But some models include in the witness
information about the third agents also the referrals of this indirect information,
forming then a chain of trust [11] [12]. Therefore privacy of how third party
agents behaved with second agents is involved in ”classic” witness information
(see ﬁgure 1). But in the case of trust models that include referrals identity, pri-
vacy problems become more extended (see ﬁgure 2). Both, third party agents and
referrals are then concerned by the disclosure of their behavior (in direct experi-
ences and witness information respectively) that could be violating the intention
of those agents of exchanging its knowledge just to the receptors (second agents)
and not to any other agent (ﬁrst agents). In fact most of the trust models when
they have to decide to share its information with other agents, they consider the
reputation of such agents in order to reject or accept the information request.
So they do not share it freely and publicly, and the knowledge of these opinions
may have future consequences over its acts in the society as we will show in the
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domain example of section 4. It has then full sense that some privacy limitations
on the further exchanges of such shared information may take place.
3 Adapting Trust Models to Protect Privacy
With the objective to deﬁne levels or conditions of privacy protection for per-
sonal information in trust models, it is necessary to identify (according to the
European Directive [4]) which legal conditions trust models have to satisfy re-
lated to privacy. In particular communications involved in the application of
trust models must legally guarantee the exercise of the following rights:
1. Participating agents have to be informed that other agents will collect (trust
opinions) personal data about them.
2. Participating agents have to know the name of other agents that will collect
such personal data, what the processing is going to be used for, to whom
your data may be transferred. They have to receive this information whether
the data was obtained directly or indirectly.
3. Participating agents are entitled to ask other agents if these other agents are
processing personal data about them;
4. Participating agents are entitled to receive a copy of this personal data in
intelligible form;
5. Participating agents are entitled to ask for the deletion, blocking or erasing
of the data.
6. Considering that decisions based on such personal data can signiﬁcantly af-
fect other agents, participating agents must adopt suitable safeguards, such
as giving you the opportunity to discuss the thinking behind them, for in-
stance contesting decisions based on inaccurate data.
So we have seen the ways data and media privacy has to legally be protected
in real life. So in advance we try to integrate a protection of the 6 privacy
rights enumerated before into the corresponding trust communications between
agents. Therefore we propose to include additional message exchanges in the
protocols of trusting relationships, that would act as control mechanisms that
allow trust models to satisfy the 6 privacy rights derived from the European
privacy directive. These message exchanges that we propose are:
1. An one way communication: A single message informing to each third agent
about the future collection of opinions about them, what the opinions are to
be used.
2. Two pairs of additional messages: corresponding to a negotiation protocol
(a proposal followed by a counterproposal) on whom these opinions may be
propagated (possible ﬁrst agents in our notation). Although agents collecting
opinions (the role of second agents) send an initial proposal (to everyone,
to a list of possible ﬁrst agents, or to none) about the two types of possible
opinion transmission (direct or indirect) the ﬁnal decision has to correspond
to the third agents, either considering or ignoring the proposal of second
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agents. That decision has to take into account several criteria: whether such
third agents are interested in propagating their behaviour, or whether the
cooperation with the second agent is of special interest, or whether some
possible ﬁrst agents are possible competitors or the opposite case, when
they are potentially interesting cooperative partners. We additionally deﬁne
an additional privacy constraint to each possible ﬁrst agent according to the
similarity of security policies applied in the communication, in order to limit
the possibility of unconscious disclosure of opinions. The corresponding ﬁnal
decision takes then the form of a privacy statement.
3. Agents acting as third agents will request any other collecting agent (ﬁrst
agents) if they are already collecting information about them and what is this
information. It involves a pair of messages: one requesting the information
and the corresponding response.
4. A one way communication: A single message ordering the deletion or blocking
of the already collected opinions.
5. An argumentative dialog between second and third agents about the rea-
sons behind the collected and propagated opinions arguing about the inac-
curacy of such decisions. Such argumentation may involve several message
exchanges discussing the diﬀerent factors or criteria involved in such opin-
ions. This sequence of messages may conclude into a ﬁnal agreement (one of
the agents acknowledging the reasons of the other one) or with a disagree-
ment. Such disagreement may then lead to a third agent deciding to order a
blocking/deletion communication.
Since all this additional message exchanges may take place or not, it is necessary
to deﬁne the possible privacy violations in order to eﬀectively control/verify the
satisfaction of the legally required privacy rights. Such violations take the next
forms:
1. A ﬁrst/second agent is collecting opinions about another one without its
knowledge (no previous informative message was sent)
2. A second agent is propagating opinions about a third agent to ﬁrst agents
that were not included in the corresponding privacy statement of the third
agent.
3. A second agent informed about an incomplete or inaccurate collected opin-
ions about a third agent (in other words, it is sending a diﬀerent or more
extended opinions to ﬁrst agents).
4. A ﬁrst/second agent ignored the order of blocking or deletion of already
collected opinions (in other words, it is still propagating them).
5. A ﬁrst/second agent do not explain/justify/motivate the opinions about a
third agent that is propagating (in other words, it does not respond to the
request of justiﬁcation from a third agent).
6. We also include an additional privacy violation corresponding to the pos-
sibility of agents breaking the security of communications where opinions
were propagated: A ﬁrst agent propagating opinions about a third that were
never collected (no previous direct or indirect reception of such opinion from
any second or third agent).
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Therefore six regulatory structures should establish what agents are allowed
and forbidden to do according to the required message exchanges and their cor-
responding violations that were described before. They will be automatically
deployed using descriptive semantic elements called norms by the so called Elec-
tronic Institutions as we will see in next section.
4 Application of Privacy Protection to ART Testbed
Domain with an Islander-built Electronic Institution
As an illustrative example we can use Agent Reputation and Trust (ART)
testbed domain [13]. In this application domain, agents act as painting apprais-
ers. Each agent has high expertise appraising paintings on some given eras but
not in the others. Additionally each agent receives a set of paintings of any era
to appraise from a central entity that simulate the painting owners. So each
agent requires the cooperation of other agents to appraise paintings belonging
to eras with own low expertise. But since the expertise of each agent is unknown,
knowing them and obtaining the cooperation of just the complementary agents
(those who has high expertise in the eras with own low expertise) become the
real goal of the ART game.
In this ART domain, each agent decides which agents are interesting partners
according to several criteria: honest and cooperative attitude, valuable knowl-
edge about others and a complementary expertise in the eras. While being honest
and cooperative with the requests from any other agent is always a good strategy
to improve our own reputational image and as a general incentive mechanism
for providing truthful opinions [14], sharing own opinion about third agents with
any other agent is not because it can propagate our information advantage (the
already known expertise of others) to our natural competitors (those who has
high expertise in the same eras than us). Therefore, a gaining strategy in this
ART game would be to limit the propagation of the knowledge about others to
those agents that are of our interests (complementary expertise) while avoiding
such knowledge to reach agents who are our natural competitors. We obtain the
illocutions, roles and relationships corresponding to ART interactions from our
previous work moving the adhoc ART testbed platform to JADE environment
[15]. Such protocols correspond to those protocols involved in ART testbed which
were formalized in a FIPA-compliant way in our previous work [16].
Therefore, we can use ART application domain to deﬁne the additional mes-
sages (including the corresponding concepts, predicates and actions used to
deﬁne the message contents) required to attend the corresponding privacy re-
quirements of the ﬁve types deﬁned before in the previous section. Next we show
the ﬁve privacy-preserving (FIPA-compliant) protocols applied to ART-testbed
that we have implemented in JADE[17]:
1. a message with INFORM as FIPA performative, and with a IsCollecting
predicate as content. This predicate has the next properties with the corre-
sponding concepts as values: Who: Appraiser Agent, On: Era, Value: Repu-
tation.
6
2. a pair of messages: The ﬁrst one with a PROPOSE performative and a State-
sPrivacy action as content. This predicate has the next properties with the
corresponding concepts as values: Who: Appraiser Agent, On: Era, Whom:
None/All/Appraiser Agent, Type: Indirection Level, How: Security Policy.
Where Indirection Level concept may have two values: direct (direct experi-
ences) and indirect (witness information) and Security Policy would describe
the rules to be applied into cryptographic algorithms of communications. The
second message, the corresponding response to this PROPOSE message may
be an ACCEPT PROPOSAL or an REJECT PROPOSAL. In case of a re-
jection, the message will include a StatesPrivacy action as content in order
to be considered a counterproposal.
3. a pair of messages: The ﬁrst one with QUERY-REF as FIPA performative
with a Is Collecting predicate as a content, where property Value has a void
Concept associated. The corresponding response message is a INFORM-REF
performative with the value property of Is Collecting predicate fulﬁlled with
the actual Reputation collected.
4. a message with REQUEST as FIPA performative, and with Blocking or
Deleting action as content. Such predicates have the next properties: Who:
Appraiser Agent, On: Era, Value: Reputation. Next, the other agent has to
answer with an AGREE performative in the response message.
5. a sequence of messages: The ﬁrst one from an iniciator agent with QUERY-
REF as FIPA performative with a Justiﬁcation predicate as a content, where
this predicate has the next properties with the corresponding concepts as val-
ues: Who: Appraiser Agent, On: Era, Value: Reputation, From: Appraiser
Agent, Type: Indirection Level, Initial Value. Where the properties From,
Type and Initial Value have a void Concept associated that the correspond-
ing response INFORM-REF message would fulﬁll with the Agent source of
such argued reputation value, the way this reputation value was collected
(direct vs. indirect) and the value originally sent by this source agent. After
this second message an additional REQUEST message might take place from
the initiatior agent to suggest the other agent to rectify the reputation value
collected from the source agent. In order to motivate such rectiﬁcation, the
initiator agent would include the details of the direct interaction with such
source agent (if that interaction really took place). This REQUEST message
includes a Rectifying action that includes the real and appraised value of the
painting corresponding to such interaction. Finally, the other agent could
answer with a REFUSE or either an AGREE performative in the response
message.
To illustrate the deﬁned protocols to protect privacy in ART testbed we include
the ﬁgure 3.
Once the additional message exchanges to be applied in the ART applica-
tion domain to protect legally privacy were deﬁned, we now have to explicitly
formalize a set of norms that constraints the behaviour of agents to the right
use of such message exchanges. The speciﬁcation of these norms corresponds






1      INFORM Initiator Is Collecting Reputation about other agent 
2a      PROPOSE States Privacy  of other agent about the others? 
2b     ACCEPT/REJECT PROPOSAL States Privacy about the others 
3a      QUERY-REF Other Agent Is Collecting Reputation about initiator agent? 
3b     INFORM-REF  Is Collecting Reputation about initiator agent  
4a     REQUEST Blocking/Deleting Reputation about initiator agent 
5a      QUERY-REF Justification  of Reputation about initiator agent? 
5b     INFORM-REF  Justification Reputation about initiator agent  
5c      REQUEST Rectifying Reputation about initiator agent  
5d    AGREE/REFUSE  Rectifying Reputation about initiator agent  
4b    AGREE  Blocking/Deleting Reputation about initiator agent  
Fig. 3. Privacy Preserving JADE Protocols in ART Domain
it designs such social constraints with a combination of textual and graphical
elements. It is also remarkable that Islander does not assumes any particular
agent architecture or language for the participating agents. This speciﬁcation
tool is complemented with other tools that simulates and tests the execution of
electronic institutions. Therefore we intend to deﬁne the six privacy violations
described in the end of section 3 with the BNF syntax format of Islander as an
extension of this work.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have motivated the use of privacy-protection measures in trust
models, both in conscious exchanges of opinions and in an unconscious way
when security attacks take place. We have enumerated ﬁve privacy protection
requirements to be applied in trust models according to the current European
Directives. Such ﬁve requirements have been implemented as interaction proto-
cols with JADE in the ART testbed domain. This protocols involve the deﬁnition
of additional concepts, predicates and actions to be included to the ART ontol-
ogy deﬁned for JADE in our previous works. Furthermore, six possible privacy
violations that might take place have been formalized as norms of an Electronic
Institution designed with Islander tool. This is the ﬁrst serious eﬀort of formal-
izing and implementing privacy protection (JADE protocols) on trust models
in agent societies. As future works we propose to implement privacy preserving
norms with Islander and to evaluate the inﬂuence that such privacy protection
causes in the trusting reasoning and decisions, for instance, has the fact that
an agent can ask about the information that is collected and can ask for dele-
tion or blocking such information, or the eﬀects caused by the agent interaction
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constraints that control privacy violations. Using the privacy protection pro-
vided, we intend to design some experiments in order to analyze the eﬀects and
performance of this privacy protection.
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